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19671 NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 487
While this case concerned a counterclaim related to the main
cause of action, a situation may arise where the defendant pleads
a counterclaim unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action. This
situation may present a problem where, as in the instant case,
jurisdiction is obtained over the defendant pursuant to New York's
long-arm statute.8 0
Under CPLR 302(b), the defendant's appearance gives the
court personal jurisdiction only with respect to causes of action
arising under CPLR 302(a). When, as in Katz, the defendant
pleads a counterclaim related to the main claim, it is clear that
he has not jeopardized this protection, since the plaintiff is similarly
free to include causes of action related to the main claim. However,
when the defendant pleads a counterclaim unrelated to the main
claim, the court could reasonably consider this to be a waiver of
this protection, and thus permit the plaintiff to amend his complaint
to include causes of action similarly unrelated to CPLR 302.
Alternatively, the court in such a case could limit the defendant's
waiver and only allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint to
include causes of action which are related to the defendant's
counterclaim.
CPLR 3215(h): Amendment.
This new provision authorizes the court clerk to enter default
judgment for failure to comply with a stipulation of settlement.
It requires that the stipulation be entered into subsequent to the
commencement of the action, and that it provide for entry of
judgment without further notice to the other party. The stipulation
must also be accompanied by both an affidavit as to the failure
to comply with the terms of the stipulation, as well as with either
a complaint or a concise statement reiterating the facts on which
the claim was based.
CPLR 3219: Amendment.
This provision provides that an amount tendered in satisfaction
of an asserted contract claim is to be deposited with the court
clerk for safekeeping and that such amount is not to be deemed
paid into court. The amendment provides that the clerk shall
place such money "in the safe or vault of the court to be provided
for the safekeeping thereof" until a disposition is made of it.
It further provides that, if the amount is neither withdrawn by
claimant nor returned to the depositor within a ten-day period,
the amount will be deemed paid into court, and payment thereof
will be made by the court clerk to the county treasurer or director
80 Either CPLR 302 or its counterpart CCA § 404 might be employed.
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of finance of the City of New York in accordance with' CPLR 2601.
Any subsequent withdrawal of the amount must be made in ac-
cordance with the provisions of CPLR 26-07 less any applicable
fees as provided for in CPLR 8010.
Collateral Estoppel: Available where issues identical and parties
all before court in prior action.
In Cummings v. Dresher,1 A, B, and X were involved ih an
automobile accident. X, a passenger in the car A was driving, and A
brought separate suits which were tried jointly against B in federal
court. A was denied recovery because of his contributory negligence.
The jury also concluded, albeit gratuitously, that B was negligent.
X recovered in his action against B when the jury found B negligent.
Subsequently, B commenced an action against A in the New-York
Supreme Court on facts arising from the same accident.
In denying A's motion for summary judgment, the appellate
division, third department,12 held that A could not assert the
defense of collateral estoppel against B since, in the action of A
against B, the jury's finding as to B's negligence was "gratuitous."
Also, A could not assert the finding of B's negligence in the action
by X against B since, presumably under the test "established in
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.,83 the issues must be identical for the
defensive assertion of collateral estoppel. In the court's opinion,
the issue of B's contributory negligence toward A was different
from the issue of B's negligence toward X. The Court of Appeals,84
in reversing the appellate division, stated that it could find no
reason for requiring the issue of negligence to be relitigated since
it was already decided in a jury trial where both. parties were
present.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been a changing concept
in the New York courts. Traditionally, a defendant would be
allowed to assert collateral estoppel only where the plaintiff would
have the same right defensively. 5 This necessitated that the de-
fendant be a party or privy in the previous suit,18 for otherwise
the plaintiff would not be able to assert that suit's finding against
8143 Misc. 2d 556, 251 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County
1964). - I8 2 Cummings v. Dresher, 24 App. Div. 2d 912, 264 N.Y.S.2d 430 (3d
Dep't 1965), affirming, 43 Misc. 2d .556, 251 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct.
Schenectady County 1964).
83 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).84 Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y2d 105, 218 N.E2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d
976 (1966).85 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
111, 127 (1912).
88 See 1B MooRE, FEDmaR. PRAc'.cE ff 0.412(1), at 1801 (2d ed. 1965).
